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WELFARE: WOMEN, POVERTY AND THE CHARTER
Lois Lowenberger, Cindy Wilkie & Erika Abner*
The Family Benefits Act and the General Welfare Assistance Act
are not statutes of general application. In order to qualify for
benefits an applicant must be a member of a certain statutory
category and must have an income below certain regulated
amounts. A significant number of these categories are gender
specific - only women are eligible for benefits - and we therefore
confront special problems in the application of equality theory. As
well, certain office policies and regulations have a greater impact
on female recipients than on male, simply by virtue of the larger
number of female recipients. We examine in this report these
policies and regulations in an attempt to assess whether they
operate so as to perpetuate and reinforce stereotypes or past
inequalities. We focus in this report on the most serious problems.
The following is not to be considered a comprehensive list of
discrimination issues in the area of Family Benefits and General
Welfare Assistance.
The Programmes
The Family Benefits (FB) programme is jointly funded by the
federal government and the province and is usually administered by
the province. It is considered to be long term financial support for
(roughly) the following groups: single mothers, the disabled and
permanently unemployed, and elderly single women. The FBA
came into effect in 1967, replacing a number of previous special
purpose statutes.
General Welfare Assistance is funded by the federal government,
the provincial government and the municipal government and is
administered by the municipalities. The municipal contribution to
benefits ranges from 0 to 50%, with an average of 20%. General
Welfare Assistance (GWA) is considered to be "short term"
temporary or interim assistance, either as a prelude to a
beneficiary receiving FBA, or to maintain an otherwise employable
person through a period of unemployment.
Lois Lowenberger is a lawyer at Neighborhood Legal
Services, Cindy Wilkie is a former member of the Board of
Directors of Neighborhood Legal Services and is a student-atlaw, and Erika Abner is a lawyer and is Research Director at
the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. This article is
reprinted from the Statute Audit conducted by the Charter of
Rights Education Fund.
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The percentage of the Ontario population receiving social
assistance in the form of GWA and FBA has ranged from 2.7% in
1961 to a high of 4.9% in 1971 and 1982 and 1983. Between 1973
and 1981 the proportion of recipients to the general population
remained quite stable at about 4.3%.1
The case compositions of FBA and GWA differs because of the
somewhat different target groups. 1982 statistics are as follows:
GWA
1.
2.
3.
4.

Single parent families
Illness/Disability
Unemployment (persons classed as
unemployable)
Other

17.4%
29.1%
46.4%
7.1%

FBA & GAINS-D
1.
2.
3.

Single parent families
Illness/Disability
Other

41.7%
52.7%
5.6%2

Children as a group comprise 38.7% of 3 GWA beneficiaries and
44.8% of FBA and GAINS-D beneficiaries.
There are about 48,000 women receiving Family Benefits as single
parents. 4
Factors such as child care responsibilities, fewer
employment opportunities, lower wages, few support systems
(particularly good quality affordable day care and adequate
housing) perpetuate this poverty.
Category of Recipient
The FBA contains numerous examples of gender specific language,
reflecting a desire for intentional differentiation. Many of these
provisions have been rectified by regulation. We would, however,
recommend that the Act be re-drafted to reflect these changes.
1.

... And the Poor Get Poorer (Ontario Social Development
Council and the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan
Toronto, Toronto, 1983), at 62-63.

2.

Id. at 58-59.

3.
4.

Id. at 60.
People First (Opseu Memo, Toronto, 1983), at 3.
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Regulations are too easy to change and are less subject to public
scrutiny. In addition, there may be some question as to whether it
is appropriate or even legal to extend assistance to new groups
which are not entitled under the Act. Some examples of such
groups are:
I.
2.
3.

Disabled wives of employable husbands now receive the
same 5benefits as disabled husbands of employable
wives;
Single fathers can receive benefits, 6 and
The entitlement of7 single women has been broadened to
include separation.

Certain policies have significantly greater impact on women simply
because of the large number of women recipients. We focus on
three that seem to be the most important, all of which affect the
category of single mothers.
First we note the requirement that a spouse who is deserted,
separated or divorced must seek support from his/her spouse. This
is mandated by a regulation 8 which requires the recipient to make
reasonable efforts to obtain compensation or realize a financial
resource.
Although dependent husbands or single fathers with
dependent children would also be subject to this requirement, the
FBA policy manual clearly focuses on women. This focus is a
reflection of the disparate impact which this requirement has upon
women. The vast majority of spouses who find themselves without
spousal and/or child support and in need of welfare assistance are
women. To require these women to engage in lengthy and ongoing
court proceedings in an often futile attempt to obtain support from
their spouses imposes an unwarranted and undue hardship on these
women.
This policy poses a very real hardship to women. Often they have
separated from a spouse who has beaten or threatened them and
are thus afraid to inflame the situation further by going to court.
They may be forced to go through the court proceedings even
though the end result (known to everyone from the beginning) will
be a dry order. Finally, they may receive a few dollars from a
spouse pursuant to a court order, for a period of several months,
5.

O.Reg. 424/82.

6.

Id., s. 2(8).

7.

O.Reg. 352/79, s. 2(7)(d).

8.

O.Reg. 285/79 s. 8.
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only to find that the FB office continues to deduct this amount
long after the spouse has stopped the payments. This policy clearly
has a far greater impact on female than on male recipients.
Regulation s.8 has a disparate impact upon women, imposing upon
women a burden and hardship imposed upon very few men. Where
an alternative approach would attain the goals of the Regulation
without such a disparate impact, such an alternative approach
should be adopted.
The second policy to be examined is the requirement that certain
kinds of recipients be "living as a single person." These include
women between the ages of 60-64, single mothers and single
fathers. 9
The policy manual indicates that a worker is to look to whether the
two persons live together "as husband and wife" and directs the
worker's attention to an array of indicia which point to such a
relationship. Welfare workers are instructed to report and/or
investigate any suspicions, allegations, written or oral complaints
which might indicate a "common law" relationship. The effects of
this policy can be devastating. Not only must women sustain
intrusions on their privacy, but they may find their total means of
support cut off on the flimsiest of evidence. Little, if any, effort
is made to determine if the man is actually contributing to the
household.
Again, the huge percentage of single mothers (as compared to
single fathers) in receipt of benefits means that this provision has a
disparate impact upon women. Female welfare recipients are
subjected to an invasion of privacy and a basis for disqualification
not generally applied to men.
The rule is based upon the assumption that a man living in a
household should and will assume responsibility for the support of
the woman and her children. Where the man is, in fact, supporting
the woman and her children, they should no longer be eligible for
assistance. However, short of actual proof of support, no benefits
should be discontinued on the basis of assumed support. We do not
assume parental or friend support; it is discriminatory to assume
"man in the house" support.
Not only is this regulation arguably a breach of section 15, based
on a disparate impact analysis, but it is also arguably a breach of
9.

O.Reg. 424/82, s. 5(b), 715/73, s. l(l)(c) contains the
definition of single person.
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the section 7 right to security of the person, guaranteed equally to
male and female persons by section 28. The invasion of privacy
incurred in the "man in the house" investigation and the threat of
withdrawal of welfare benefits based upon supposition rather than
proof of support may constitute breaches of the right to security of
the person and, in the context of this particular rule, a breach to
which women are subjected far more frequently than men.
Finally we are concerned by the announced government intention
to transfer all "able-bodied" recipients, including single parents to
municipal administration. This is combined with certain work
incentive programmes designed to assist and encourage recipients
to find employment. The concern is that single mothers will be
forced to seek work and will be penalized if they resist or are
unable to do so.
Government assurances that they will receive continuing quality
support services are tepid, at best.
This is a kind of superficial equality, equal treatment of "ablebodied recipients", which in effect constitutes unequal treatment
because it fails to accommodate the reality and needs of many
women in their role as primary child-rearer.
Due to the
disproportionate number of single mothers in receipt of family
benefits, a rule which penalizes single parents who are unable or
unwilling to seek paid employment has a disparate impact upon
women. The inequity of the rule lies in its failure to recognize
that these single parents are engaged in full time child care and
that this is a valuable and socially meaningful occupation. We
already recognize that it is inappropriate to require certain classes
of welfare recipients (for example, disabled recipients) to seek
employment. We should similarly continue to recognize that it is
inappropriate to require single parents to seek employment. It is
and should be recognized as perfectly legitimate for a single parent
to choose to look after his/her children on a full-time basis. Where
the non-custodial parent cannot or will not provide financially for
the care of the children, the state must accept financial
responsibility, as it does, for example, in the case of permanently
unemployable individuals. It must also be recognized that the
availability and economics of day care are such that a single parent
may not be able to afford to seek employment. If the concept of
equality is not broad enough to encompass what have traditionally
been considered women's roles, then the concept has little meaning
or substance for most women and will only reinforce and
perpetuate their second class status.
A final issue relating to benefit recipients which has a disparate
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impact upon women is that of the eligibility of sponsored
immigrants for welfare benefits. This issue is discussed fully in the
Immigration Chapter of the Statute Audit. We simply point to it
here as a matter of concern.
Benefit Levels
a)

Disperate Impact: Section 15

There are a number of respects in which the benefit levels and
other financial criteria attached to family benefits are
discriminatory toward women. All of these relate to the different
standard applied to single parent recipients compared to the other
categories of FB recipients - aged, disabled, and permanently
unemployable (PUE):
1.
All recipients are allowed to have a certain amount of '"liquid
assets", i.e. savings. However, a disabled, PUE or aged recipient
with one dependent can have $5,500 in assets while a sole support
parent with one dependent child can have only $5,000.10
3.
All recipients can earn income up to a certain amount, which
can be directed to work related expenses. Once the ceiling is
reached there will be a dollar for dollar dejuction from benefits.
However, disabled, PUE and aged recipients can earn $50 per
month for these purposes; sole support parents only $40. Further, a
recipient may average his or her earnings over a certain period
where it is advantageous. For the disabled, PUE or aged the period
is six months for sole support parents the period is only four
months. In addition, sole support parents are disqualified if they
work in excess of 120 hours per month for more than four
consecutive months. 1 1
4.
Aged, disabled and PUE recipients receive a higher level of
benefits than single parents.
There is no apparent rationale for the distinctive treatment of
single parents which, in all three areas, functions to their economic
disadvantage. This is a clear case of legislated disparate impact
against women. Although gender neutral on their face, these
regulations operate to the disadvantage of one class of welfare
recipients, as compared to other recipients. The disadvantaged
class (single parents) is composed predominantly of women. The
fact that not all members of a particular group (i.e. not all women)
10.
11.

O.Reg. 1104/80, s. 3(2)(6), 1104/80 s. 3(l)(b).
O.Reg. 1104/80,s. 13(2)1.i, 13(2)1.ii.
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are subject to unequal treatment does not nullify the disparate
impact upon those members of that group who are being treated
Where there is no apparent justification for the
unequally.
difference in treatment, it may be considered discrimination and a
breach of section 15 of the Charter.
b)

Secwity of the Person

Section7

Benefits levels are in all cases below the poverty line, as
measured by both the Statistics Canada Poverty Line and the
Adequate Budget Approach developed by the Social Planning
Council of Metropolitan Toronto. For example, a mother on GWA
with three children aged 3, 6 and 8 receives an income which is
50.5% of the Statistics Canada Poverty Line and 58.5% of the
Adequate Budget. The same woman on FBA receives an income
which is 56.7% of the Statistics Canada Poverty Line and 65.4% of
the Adequate Budget. Moreover, between 1975 and 1983, there has
been a marked decline in the adequacy of benefits. The benefits to
a woman with three children on GWA declined from 57.7% of the
Poverty Line in 1975 to 50.5% in 1983. The comparable benefits on
FBA declined from 62.4% of the Poverty Line in 1975 to 56.7% in
1983.12
Because of the far larger number of female welfare
recipients, the inadequacy of the benefit levels inevitably have a
harsher effect upon women. However, all welfare recipients are
subject to the same inadequacies and the issue here is more basic
than that of discrimination or unequal treatment, although these
are certainly elements of the problem. In terms of the Charter,
the question would be framed with reference to Section 7 - does
the right to security of the person impose a positive duty upon the
government to provide a certain minimum level of welfare
benefits, arguably one which at least meets the current poverty
line? Although we do argue that section 7 contains substantive as
well as procedural rights and that in certain circumstances
recognition of those rights may impose a positive duty upon
government, we recognize that the requirement of a minimum
level of welfare benefits may be beyond the intended purview of
section 7.
However, the fact that specific action may not be legally
required under the Charter should not foreclose discussion of the
issue. For those who, for whatever legitimate reason, are unable
to work in the paid labour force, society must provide basic
financial support. The majority of the victims of poverty are
12.

Supra, note 1 at 20-27.
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women. This is a function in part of past discrimination and
inequalities. One way, if not to redress, at least to compensate for
those inequalities would be to ensure for those women, along with
all other welfare recipients, a decent basic standard of living.
Theoretical Problems and Ideas
We pose the following questions in the hope that they will assist in
formulating a consistent theoretical perspective about women and
social assistance programmes.
1.

Do we wish to encourage women to stay at home and raise
children or to become financially independent, or do we wish
to be as neutral as possible?

2.

Do we wish to perpetuate and support the distinct role of
women as child rearers or do we wish to attempt to spread
responsibility equally among men and women?

3.

Whatever our ultimate aims, how do we reconcile the present
situation of women with future goals?

4.

Do we take the position that there is a right to social
assistance and more particularly, that women should have a
right to choose to stay home and raise their children? If so,
how does this tie into our perspective on women raising
children who are not on social assistance?

